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Abstract
Among anonymity systems, DC-nets have long held at-
traction for their resistance to traffic analysis attacks, but
practical implementations remain vulnerable to internal
disruption or “jamming” attacks, which require time-
consuming detection procedures to resolve. We present
Verdict, the first practical anonymous group communi-
cation system built using proactively verifiable DC-nets:
participants use public-key cryptography to construct
DC-net ciphertexts, and use zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge to detect and exclude misbehavior before dis-
ruption. We compare three alternative constructions for
verifiable DC-nets: one using bilinear maps and two
based on simpler ElGamal encryption. While verifiable
DC-nets incur higher computational overheads due to the
public-key cryptography involved, our experiments sug-
gest that Verdict is practical for anonymous group mes-
saging or microblogging applications, supporting groups
of 100 clients at 1 second per round or 1000 clients at
10 seconds per round. Furthermore, we show how exist-
ing symmetric-key DC-nets can “fall back” to a verifiable
DC-net to quickly identify misbehavior, speeding up pre-
vious detections schemes by two orders of magnitude.
1 Introduction
A right to anonymity is fundamental to democratic cul-
ture, freedom of speech [3, 48], peaceful resistance to
repression [41], and protecting minority rights [47].
Anonymizing relay tools, such as Tor [19], offer practi-
cal and scalable anonymous communication but are vul-
nerable to traffic analysis attacks [4, 36, 40] feasible for
powerful adversaries, such as ISPs in authoritarian states.
Dining cryptographers networks [13] (DC-nets)
promise security even against traffic analysis attacks,
and recent systems such as Herbivore [26, 46] and Dis-
sent [15, 54] have improved the scalability of DC-net-
style systems. However, these systems are still vulner-
able to internal disruption attacks in which a misbehav-
ing member anonymously “jams” communication, either
completely or selectively. Dissent includes a retrospec-
tive blame procedure that can eventually exclude disrup-
tors, but at high cost: tracing a disruptor in a 1,000-
member group takes over 60 minutes [54], and the pro-
tocol makes no communication progress until it restarts
“from scratch.” An adversary who infiltrates such a
group with f colluding members can “sacrifice” them
one at a time to disrupt all communication for f con-
tiguous hours at any time—long enough time to cause a
communications blackout before or during an important
mass protest, for example.
Verdict, a novel but practical group anonymity sys-
tem, thwarts such disruptions while maintaining DC-
nets’ resistance to traffic analysis. At Verdict’s core lies
a verifiable DC-net primitive, derived from theoretical
work proposed and formalized by Golle and Juels [27],
which requires participating nodes to prove proactively
the well-formedness of messages they send. The first
working system we are aware of to implement verifiable
DC-nets, Verdict supports three alternative schemes for
comparison: a pairing scheme using bilinear maps simi-
lar to the Golle-Juels approach, and two schemes based
on ElGamal encryption in conventional integer or ellip-
tic curve groups. Verdict incorporates this verifiable core
into a client/server architecture like Dissent’s [54], to
achieve scalability and robustness to client churn. As
in Dissent, Verdict maintains security as long as at least
one of the participating servers is honest, and participants
need not know or guess which servers are honest.
Due to their reliance on public-key cryptography, ver-
ifiable DC-nets incur higher computation overheads than
traditional DC-nets, which primarily use symmetric-key
cryptography (e.g., AES). We expect this CPU cost to
be acceptable in applications where messages are usually
short (e.g., chat or microblogging), where costs are dom-
inated by network delays, or in groups with relatively
open or antagonistic membership where disruption risks
may be high. Under realistic conditions, we find that
Verdict can support groups of 100 users while maintain-
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ing 1-second messaging latencies, or 1000-user groups
with 10-second latencies. In a trace-driven evaluation
of full-system performance for a microblogging applica-
tion, Verdict is able to keep up with symmetric-key DC-
nets in groups of up to 250 active users.
In contrast with the above “purist” approach, which
uses expensive public-key cryptography to construct all
DC-net ciphertexts, Verdict also implements and evalu-
ates a hybrid approach that uses symmetric-key DC-nets
for data communication when not under disruption at-
tack, but leverages verifiable DC-nets to enable the sys-
tem to respond much more quickly and inexpensively
to disruption attacks. Dissent uses a verifiable shuf-
fle [38] to broadcast an accusation anonymously; this
shuffle dominates the cost of identifying disruptors. By
replacing this verifiable shuffle with a verifiable DC-nets
round, Verdict preserves the disruption-free performance
of symmetric-key DC-nets, but reduces the time to iden-
tify a disruptor in a 1000-node group by two orders of
magnitude, from 20 minutes to 26 seconds.
This paper’s primary contributions are:
• the first working implementation and experimental
evaluation of verifiable DC-nets in a practical anony-
mous communication system,
• two novel verifiable DC-nets constructions using stan-
dard modular integer and elliptic curve groups, offer-
ing an order of magnitude lower computational cost
than the original pairing approach [27],
• a hybrid system design that preserves performance
of symmetric-key DC-nets, while reducing disruption
resolution costs by two orders of magnitude, and
• experimental evidence suggesting that verifiable DC-
nets may be practical for realistic applications, such as
anonymous microblogging.
Section 2 introduces DC-nets and the disruption prob-
lem. Section 3 outlines Verdict’s architecture and adver-
sary model, and Sections 4 and 5 describe its messaging
protocol and cryptographic schemes. Section 6 presents
application scenarios and evaluation results, Section 7
describes related work, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Background and Motivation
This section first introduces the basic DC-nets concept
and known generalizations, then motivates the need for
proactive accountability.
2.1 Anonymity with Strong Adversaries
To make the need for traffic-analysis-resistant anonymity
systems more concrete, consider a political journalist
who obtains some important secret government docu-
ments (e.g., the Pentagon Papers) from a confidential
source. If the journalist publishes these documents un-
der her own name, the journalist might risk prosecution
Figure 1: The basic DC-nets algorithm
or interrogation, and she might be pressured to reveal the
source of the documents.
To reduce such risks, a number of political journalists
could form a Verdict communication group. Any partic-
ipating journalist may then anonymously broadcast the
documents to the entire group of journalists, such that
no member of the group can determine which journal-
ist sent the documents. With Verdict, even if a govern-
ment agency plants agents within the group of journalists
and observes all network traffic during a protocol run, the
agency remains unable to learn the source of the leak.
Existing systems such as Tor, which are practical
and scalable but vulnerable to known traffic analysis at-
tacks [17, 19, 34], cannot guarantee security in this con-
text. For example, if a US journalist posts a leak to a US
website, via a Tor connection whose entry and exit relays
are in Europe, then an eavesdropper capable of moni-
toring transatlantic links [33] can de-anonymize the user
via traffic analysis [19, 37]. Prior anonymity systems at-
tempting to offer resistance to traffic analysis, discussed
in Section 7, suffer from poor performance or vulnera-
bility to active denial-of-service attacks.
2.2 DC-nets Overview
DC-nets [13] provide anonymous broadcast within a
group of participants, who communicate lock-step in a
series of rounds. In a given round, each group member
contributes an equal length ciphertext that, when com-
bined with all other members’ ciphertexts, reveals one or
more cleartext messages. All group members know that
each message was sent by some group member—but do
not know which member sent each message.
In its simplest form, illustrated in Figure 1, we assume
one group member wishes to broadcast a 1-bit message
anonymously. To do so, every pair of members flips a
coin, secretly agreeing on the random outcome of that
coin flip. An N-member group thus flips N(N − 1)/2
coins in total, of which each member observes the out-
come of N − 1 coins. Each member then XORs to-
gether the values of the N − 1 coins she observes, ad-
ditionally the member who wishes to broadcast the 1-bit
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message XORs in the value of that message, to produce
that member’s DC-nets ciphertext. Each group member
then broadcasts her 1-bit ciphertext to the other mem-
bers. Finally, each member collects and XORs all N
members’ ciphertexts together. Since the value of each
shared coin is XORed into exactly two members’ cipher-
texts, all the coins cancel out, leaving only the anony-
mous message, while provably revealing no information
about which group member sent the message.
2.3 Practical Generalizations
As a standard generalization of DC-nets to communicate
L-bit messages, all members in principle simply run L in-
stances of the protocol in parallel. Each pair of members
flips and agrees upon L shared coins, and each member
XORs together the L-bit strings she observes with her
optional L-bit anonymous message to produce L-bit ci-
phertexts, which XOR together to reveal the L-bit mes-
sage. For efficiency, in practice each pair of group mem-
bers forms a cryptographic shared secret—via Diffie-
Hellman key agreement, for example—then group mem-
bers use a cryptographic pseudo-random number gener-
ator (PRNG) to produce the L-bit strings.
As a complementary generalization, we can use any
finite alphabet or group in place of coins or bits, as long
as we have: (a) a suitable combining operator analogous
to XOR, (b) a way to encode messages in the chosen al-
phabet, and (c) a way to generate complementary pairs
of one-time pads in the alphabet that cancel under the
chosen combining operator. For example, the alphabet
might be 8-bit bytes, the combining operator might be
addition modulo 256, and from each pairwise shared se-
cret, one member of the pair generates bytes B1, . . . ,Bk
from a PRNG, while the other member generates corre-
sponding two’s complement bytes −B1, . . . ,−Bk.
2.4 Disruption and Verifiable DC-nets
A key weakness of DC-nets is that a single malicious in-
sider can easily block all communication. An attacker
who transmits arbitrary bits—instead of the XORed ci-
phertext that the protocol prescribes—unilaterally and
anonymously jams all DC-net communication.
In many online venues such as blogs, chat rooms, and
social networks, some users may have legitimate needs
for strong anonymity—protest organizers residing in an
authoritarian state, for example—while other antagonis-
tic users (e.g., secret police infiltrators) may attempt to
block communication if they cannot de-anonymize “un-
approved” senders. Even in a system like Dissent that
can eventually trace and exclude disruptors, an adver-
sary with multiple colluding dishonest group members
may still be able to slow or halt communication for long
enough to ruin the service’s usability for honest partici-
pants. Further, if the group’s membership is open enough
to allow new disruptive members to join more quickly
than the tracing process operates, then these infiltrators
may be able to shut down communication permanently.
Verifiable DC-nets [27] leverage algebraic groups,
such as elliptic curve groups, as the DC-nets alphabet.
Using such groups allows for disruption resistance, by
enabling members to prove the correctness of their ci-
phertexts’ construction without compromising the se-
crecy of the shared pseudo-random seeds. Using a hybrid
approach that combines a traditional DC-net with a veri-
fiable DC-net, Verdict can achieve the messaging latency
of a traditional XOR-based DC-net while providing the
strong disruption-resistance of verifiable DC-nets.
3 Verdict Architecture Overview
In this section, we describe the individual components of
Verdict and how they combine to form the overall anony-
mous communication system.
3.1 Deployment and Adversary Model
Verdict builds on Dissent [53, 54] and uses the multi-
provider cloud model illustrated in Figure 2 (a) to
achieve scalability and resilience to ordinary node
and link failures. In this model, a communication
group consists of mostly unreliable clients, and a few
servers we assume to be highly available and well-
provisioned. Servers in a group should be administered
independently—each furnished by a different anonymity
provider, for example—to limit risk of all servers be-
ing compromised and colluding against the clients. The
servers may be geographically or topologically close,
however—possibly even hosted in the same data center,
in locked cages physically and administratively accessi-
ble only to separate, independent authorities.
Clients directly communicate, at a minimum, with a
single upstream server, while each server communicates
with all other servers. This topology, shown in Fig-
ure 2 (b), reduces the communication and computation
burden on the clients, and enables the system to make
progress regardless of client churn. In particular, clients
need not know which other clients are online at the time
they submit their DC-net ciphertexts to their upstream
server; clients only assume that all servers are online.
To ensure anonymity, clients need not assume that any
particular server is trustworthy—a client need not even
trust its immediately upstream server. Instead, clients
trust only that there exists at least one one honest
server, an assumption previously dubbed anytrust [53,
54], as a trust analog to anycast communication.
Verdict, like Dissent, achieves security under the
anytrust assumption through the DC-nets key-sharing
model shown in Figure 2 (c). Each client shares a se-
cret with every server, rendering client ciphertexts in-
decipherable without the cooperation of all servers, and
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(a) Multi-provider cloud model [54] (b) Communication topology (c) DC-nets secret sharing
Figure 2: Verdict/Dissent deployment model, physical communication topology, and DC-nets secret sharing
hence protecting a client’s anonymity even if its immedi-
ately upstream server is malicious. Each client ultimately
obtains an anonymity set consisting of the set of all hon-
est clients, provided that the anytrust assumption holds,
and provided the message contents themselves do not in
some way reveal the sender’s identity.
A malicious server might refuse to service honest
clients, but such refusal does not compromise clients’
anonymity—victims can simply switch to a different
server. Although not yet supported in our Verdict pro-
totype, Section 4.6 discusses how one might use thresh-
old secret sharing to tolerate server failures, at the cost of
requiring that we assume multiple servers are honest.
3.2 Security Goals
Verdict’s goal is to offer anonymity and disruption resis-
tance in the face of a strong adversary who can poten-
tially monitor all network links, modify packets as they
traverse the network, and compromise a potentially large
fraction of a group’s participating members. We say that
a participant is honest if it follows the protocol exactly
and does not collude with or leak secret information to
other nodes. A participant is dishonest otherwise. Dis-
honest nodes can exhibit Byzantine behavior—they can
be arbitrarily incorrect and can even just “go silent.”
The system is designed to provide anonymity among
the set of honest participants, who remain online and un-
compromised throughout an interaction period, and who
do not compromise their identity via the content of the
messages they send. We define this set of honest and
online participants as the anonymity set for a protocol
run. If a group contains many colluding dishonest par-
ticipants, Verdict can anonymize the honest participants
only among the remaining subset of honest members:
in the worst case of a group containing only one hon-
est member, for example, Verdict operates but can offer
that member no meaningful anonymity.
Similarly, Verdict does not prevent long-term inter-
section attacks [30] against otherwise-honest participants
who repeatedly come and go during an interaction pe-
riod, leaking information to an adversary who can corre-
late online status with linkable anonymous posts. Rea-
soning about anonymity sets generally requires making
inherently untestable assumptions about how many group
members may be dishonest or unreliable, but Verdict at
least does not assume that the honest participants know
which other participants are honest and reliable.
Finally, Verdict’s disruption-resistant design addresses
internal disruption attacks by misbehaving anonymous
participants, a problem specific to anonymous commu-
nication tools and particularly DC-nets. Like any dis-
tributed system, Verdict may be vulnerable to more gen-
eral network-level Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks as
well, particularly against the servers that are critical to
the system’s availability and performance. Such attacks
are important in practice, but not specific to anonymous
communication systems. This paper thus does not ad-
dress general DoS attacks since well-known defenses ap-
ply, such as server provisioning, selective traffic block-
ing, and proof-of-life or proof-of-work challenges.
4 Protocol Design
Verdict consists of two major components: the messag-
ing protocol, and the cryptographic primitive clients and
servers use to construct their ciphertexts. This section de-
scribes the Verdict messaging protocols, and the follow-
ing section describes the cryptographic constructions.
4.1 Core Verdict Protocol
Figure 3 summarizes the steps comprising a normal-case
run of the Verdict protocol. This protocol represents a
direct adaptation of the DC-nets scheme (Section 2.2) to
the two-level communication topology illustrated in Fig-
ure 2 (b), and to the client/server secret-sharing graph in
Figure 2 (c). As in Dissent, Verdict’s anonymity guar-
antee relies on Chaum’s original security analysis [13],
in which an honest node’s anonymity set consists of the
set of honest nodes that remain connected in the secret-
sharing graph after removing links to dishonest nodes.
Since each client shares a secret with every server, and
we assume that there exists at least one honest server, this
honest server forms a “hub” connecting all honest nodes.
This anonymity property holds regardless of physical
communication topology, which is why the clients need
not trust their immediately upstream server.
The ciphertext- and proof-generation processes as-
sume that communication in the DC-net is broken up into
time slots (akin to TDMA), such that only one client—
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1. Client Ciphertext Generation. Each client i gen-
erates a client ciphertext, and submits this cipher-
text to client i’s upstream server. If client i is the
anonymous owner of the current slot, the client com-
putes and submits a slot owner ciphertext using her
pseudonym secret key and her plaintext message m.
2. Client Set Sharing. After receiving valid client
ciphertexts from its currently connected downstream
clients, each server j broadcasts to all servers its set
C j of collected client ciphertexts.
3. Server Ciphertext Generation. After receiving
client ciphertext sets from all servers, each server j
computes C =⋃k Ck, the set of client ciphertexts col-
lected by all servers. Server j then uses C to compute
a server ciphertext corresponding to the set of submit-
ted client ciphertexts. Server j broadcasts this server
ciphertext to all other servers.
4. Plaintext Reveal. After receiving a server cipher-
text from every other server, each server j combines
the |C| client ciphertexts and M server ciphertexts to
reveal the plaintext message m. Server j signs m and
broadcasts its signature σ j to all servers.
5. Plaintext Sharing. After receiving valid signa-
tures from all servers, server j sends the plaintext
message m and the M signatures σ1, . . . ,σM (one from
each server) to its downstream clients.
6. Client Verification. Upon receiving the plaintext
m and M valid signatures from its upstream server,
client i accepts the plaintext message and considers
the messaging round to have completed successfully.
All messages sent over the network include a session
nonce and are signed with the sender’s long-term
well-known (non-anonymous) signing key.
Figure 3: Core Verdict messaging protocol
the slot’s owner—is allowed to send an anonymous mes-
sage in each time slot. The owner of a slot is the client
who holds the private key corresponding to a pseudonym
public key assigned to the slot. To maintain the slot
owner’s anonymity, no one must know which client owns
which transmission slot. Section 4.3 below describes the
assignment of pseudonym keys to transmission slots.
Figure 4 shows an example DC-net transmission
schedule with three slots, owned by pseudonyms A, B,
and C. Each slot owner can transmit one message per
messaging round, and the slot ordering in the schedule
remains the same for the duration of the Verdict session.
4.2 Verifiable Ciphertexts in Verdict
While Verdict’s anonymity derives from the same prin-
ciples as Dissent’s, the key difference is in the “alpha-
Figure 4: Example DC-net transmission schedule, where
anonymous authors A, B, and C transmit in each round.
bet” with which Verdict generates DC-net ciphertexts,
and in the way Verdict combines and checks those ci-
phertexts. Dissent uses a symmetric-key cryptographic
pseudo-random number generators (PRNG) to generate
shared secrets, and uses bitwise XOR to combine them
and later to reveal the plaintext message. While efficient,
the symmetric-key approach offers no way to check that
any node’s ciphertext was generated correctly until the fi-
nal cleartext messages are revealed. If any node corrupts
a protocol round by sending an incorrect ciphertext, Dis-
sent can eventually identify that node only via a complex
retroactive blame procedure.
Verdict, in contrast, divides messages into chunks
small enough to be encoded into elements of algebraic
groups, such as Schnorr [44] or elliptic curve groups,
to which known proof-of-knowledge techniques apply.
Section 5 later outlines three particular ciphertext gen-
eration schemes that Verdict implements, although Ver-
dict’s architecture and protocol design is agnostic to the
specific scheme. These schemes may be considered anal-
ogous to “pluggable” ciphersuites in SSL/TLS.
Thus, any Verdict ciphertext is generated on behalf of
the holder of some particular pseudonym keypair. While
the details of a ciphertext correctness proof depend on
the particular scheme, all such proofs have the general
form of an “either/or” knowledge proof, of the type sys-
tematized by Camenisch and Stadler [11]. In particular,
a ciphertext correctness proof attests that either:
• the ciphertext is an encryption of any message, and the
producer of the ciphertext holds the private part of the
pseudonym key for this slot, OR
• the ciphertext is an encryption of a null cover message,
which, when combined with other cover ciphertexts
and exactly one actual encrypted message ciphertext,
will combine to reveal the encrypted message.
Only the pseudonym key owner can produce a correct-
ness proof for an arbitrary message following the first al-
ternative above, while any node can generate an “honest”
cover ciphertext—and the proof by construction reveals
no information about which alternative the proof gener-
ator followed. We leave discussion of further details of
this process to Section 5, but merely note that such “ei-
ther/or” proofs are pervasive and well-understood in the
cryptographic theory community.
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In Verdict, each client computes and attaches a crypto-
graphic correctness proof to each ciphertext it sends to its
upstream server, and each server in turn attaches a cor-
rectness proof to the server-side ciphertext it generates
in Phase 3 of each round (Figure 3). In principle, there-
fore, each server can immediately verify the correctness
of any client’s or other server’s ciphertext it receives, be-
fore “accepting” it and combining it with the other ci-
phertexts for that protocol round. As in Dissent, Verdict
achieves resilience to client churn by (optionally) requir-
ing clients to submit their ciphertexts before a certain
“deadline” in each messaging round. We describe this
technique in Section 4.5.
While Verdict nodes can in principle verify the cor-
rectness of any received ciphertext immediately, actually
doing so has performance costs. These costs lead to de-
sign tradeoffs between “eager” and “lazy” verification,
both of which we implement and evaluate later in Sec-
tion 6. Lazy verification enables the critical servers to
avoid significant computation costs during rounds that
are not disrupted, at the expense of making a round’s out-
put unusable if it is disrupted. Even if a lazily-verified
round is disrupted, however, the fact that Verdict nodes
always generate and transmit signed ciphertext correct-
ness proofs greatly simplifies and shortens the retroactive
blame process with respect to Dissent.
Verdict currently treats server-side failures of all
types, including invalid server ciphertexts, as “major
events” requiring administrative action, and simply halts
the protocol with an alert until such action is taken. Sec-
tion 4.6 later discusses approaches to make Verdict re-
silient against server-side failures, but we leave imple-
menting and evaluating such mechanisms to future work.
Such server-side failures affect only availability, how-
ever; anonymity remains protected as long as at least one
(not necessarily online) server remains uncompromised.
4.3 Scheduling Pseudonym Keys
To assign ownership of transmission slots to clients in
such a way that no one knows which client owns which
slot, Verdict applies an architectural idea from Dis-
sent [54]. At the start of a Verdict session, each of the
N clients secretly submits a slot owner pseudonym key
to a verifiable shuffle protocol [38] run by the servers.
The public output of the shuffle is the N pseudonym keys
in permuted order—such that no one knows which node
submitted which pseudonym key other than their own.
Verdict participants then use each of these N pseudonym
keys to initialize N concurrent instances of the core Ver-
dict DC-net with each instance becoming a slot in a ver-
ifiable DC-net transmission schedule.
Scheduling Policy Not every client will necessarily
want to transmit an anonymous message in every mes-
saging round. In addition, clients may want to transmit
messages of different lengths. To make Verdict more ef-
ficient in these cases, Verdict allows clients to request a
change in the length of their messaging slot (e.g., so that
a client can send a long message in a single messaging
round) and to temporarily “close” their transmission slot
(if a client does not expect to send a message for several
rounds). Clients issue these requests by prepending a few
bits of control data to the anonymous message they send
in their transmission slot.
4.4 Hybrid XOR/Verifiable DC-Nets
While the verifiable DC-net design above may be needed
in scenarios in which disruptions are frequent, the public-
key cryptography involved imposes a much higher com-
putational cost than traditional XOR-based DC-nets. To
offer better performance in groups with fewer or less fre-
quent disruptions, Verdict has a “hybrid” mode of opera-
tion that uses the fast XOR-based DC-net when there are
no active disruptors in the group, and reverts to a verifi-
able DC-net in the presence of an active disruptor. This
hybrid Verdict DC-net marries the relatively low com-
putational cost of the XOR-based DC-net with the low
accountability cost of the verifiable DC-net.
To set up a hybrid DC-net session, all protocol partici-
pants first participate in a pseudonym signing key shuffle,
as described above in Section 4.3. At the conclusion of
the shuffle, all nodes initialize two DC-net slots for each
of the N clients: one traditional Dissent-style DC-net,
and one verifiable Verdict DC-net.
When the group is not being disrupted, clients trans-
mit in their Dissent DC-net slot, allowing nodes to take
advantage of the speed of Dissent’s XOR-based DC-net.
When nodes detect the corruption of a message in the
Dissent DC-net, the client whose message was corrupted
reverts to transmitting in its verifiable DC-net slot. This
client can use the verifiable slot to transmit anonymously
the “accusation” necessary to identify the disruptor in the
Dissent accusation process [54, Section 3.9]. The Verdict
DC-net replaces the expensive verifiable shuffle neces-
sary for nodes to exchange the accusation information in
Dissent. In this way, Verdict offers the normal-case ef-
ficiency of XOR-based DC-nets while greatly reducing
the cost of tracing and excluding disruptors.
4.5 Client Churn
In realistic deployments clients may go offline at any
time, and this problem becomes severe in large groups
of unreliable clients exhibiting constant churn. To pre-
vent slow or unresponsive clients from disrupting com-
munication, the servers need not wait in Phase 2 for
all downstream clients to submit ciphertexts. Instead,
servers can wait for a fixed threshold of t ≤ N clients
to submit ciphertexts, or for some fixed time interval τ .
Servers might also use some more complicated window
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closure policy, as in Dissent [54]: e.g., wait for a thresh-
old of clients and then an additional time period before
proceeding. The participants must agree on a window
closure policy before the protocol run begins.
There is an inherent tradeoff between anonymity and
the system’s ability to cope with unresponsive clients. If
the servers close the ciphertext submission window too
aggressively, honest but slow clients might be unable to
submit their ciphertexts in time, reducing the anonymity
of clients who do manage to submit messages. In con-
trast, if the servers wait until every client has submitted
a ciphertext, a single faulty client could prevent protocol
progress indefinitely. Optimal policy choices depend on
the security requirements of the application at hand.
4.6 Limitations and Future Enhancements
This section outlines some of Verdict’s current limita-
tions, deployment issues, and areas for future work.
Group Evolution Verdict’s architecture assumes that,
at the start of the protocol, group members agree to
a “roster” of protocol participants—essentially a list of
public keys defining the group’s membership. The cur-
rent prototype simplistically assumes that this group ros-
ter is a static list, and that the session nonce is a hash
of a file containing this roster and other group policy in-
formation. This design trivially ensures that all nodes
participating in a given group (uniquely identified by its
session nonce) agree upon the same roster and policy.
Changing the group roster or policy in the current pro-
totype requires forming a new group, but we are explor-
ing approaches to group management which would allow
for on-the-fly membership changes. For now, we simply
note that Verdict’s security properties critically depend
on group membership policy decisions, which affect how
quickly adversarial participants can infiltrate a group. We
consider group management policy to be orthogonal to
this paper’s communication mechanisms.
Sybil Attacks If it is too easy to join a group, dishon-
est participants might flood the group with Sybil identi-
ties [20], giving an anonymous slot owner the impression
that she has more anonymity than she actually does. The
current “static group” design shifts the Sybil attack pre-
vention problem to whomever formulates the group ros-
ter. Dynamic group management schemes could leverage
existing Sybil prevention techniques [49, 55, 56], but we
do not consider such approaches herein.
Membership Concealment Verdict considers the
group roster, containing the public keys of all partici-
pants, to be public information: concealing participation
in the protocol is an orthogonal security goal that Ver-
dict currently does not address. We are exploring the use
of anonymous authentication techniques [24, 31, 43] to
enable Verdict clients to “sign on” and prove member-
ship in the group without revealing to the Verdict servers
(or to the adversary) which specific group members are
online at any given time. Further, we expect that Ver-
dict’s design could be composed with other techniques to
achieve membership concealment [35, 51], but we leave
such enhancements to future work.
Unresponsive Servers Verdict currently assumes that
the servers supporting a group are well-provisioned and
highly reliable, and the system simply ceases communi-
cation progress in the face of any server’s failure. Any
fault-masking mechanism would be problematic, in fact,
in the face of Verdict’s assumption that only one server
might be honest: if that one honest server goes offline
and the protocol continues without it, then the remaining
dishonest servers could collude against all honest users.
If we assume that there are h > 1 honest servers,
however, a currently unimplemented variation of Verdict
could allow progress if as many as h− 1 servers are un-
responsive. Before the protocol run, every server uses
a publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme [45], to dis-
tribute shares of its per-session secret key. The scheme
is configured such that any quorum of M− h+ 1 shares
is sufficient to reconstruct the secret. Thus, at least one
honest server must remain online and contribute a share
for a secret to be reconstructed. (Golle and Juels [27] also
use a secret-sharing scheme, but they rely on a trusted
third-party to generate and distribute the shares.)
If a server becomes unresponsive, the remaining on-
line servers can broadcast their shares of the unrespon-
sive server’s secret key. Once a quorum of servers broad-
casts these shares, the remaining online servers will be
able to reconstruct the unresponsive server’s private key.
Thereafter, each server can simulate the unresponsive
server’s messages for the rest of the protocol session.
Blame Recovery The current Verdict prototype can
detect server misbehavior, but it does not yet have a
mechanism by which the remaining servers can collec-
tively form a new group “roster” with the misbehaving
nodes removed. We expect off-the-shelf Byzantine Fault
Tolerance algorithms [12] to be applicable to this group
evolution problem. Using BFT to achieve agreement,
however, requires a stronger security assumption: in a
group with f dishonest servers, there must be at least
3 f + 1 total servers. We sketch a possible BFT-based
group evolution approach here.
The BFT cluster’s shared state in this case is the group
“roster,” containing the session nonce and a list of all ac-
tive Verdict clients and servers, identified by their public
keys.
The two operations in this BFT system are:
• EVOLVE GROUP(nonce, node index, proof), a
request to remove a dishonest node (identified by
node index) from the group roster. BFT servers
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remove the dishonest node from the group if the proof
is valid, yielding the new group roster.
• GET GROUP(), which returns current the group roster.
If, at some point during the Verdict session, a Ver-
dict node concludes that the protocol has failed due to
the dishonesty of node d, this honest node makes an
EVOLVE GROUP request to the BFT cluster and waits for
a response. The honest BFT servers will agree on a
new group roster with the dishonest node d removed
and the Verdict servers will begin a new instance of the
Verdict protocol with the new group roster. Clients use
GET GROUP to learn the new group roster.
5 Verifiable DC-net Constructions
The Verdict architecture relies on a verifiable DC-net
primitive that has many possible implementations. In this
section, we first describe the general interface that each
of the cryptographic constructions must implement—
which could be described as a “Verdict ciphersuite
API”—then we describe the three specific experimental
schemes that Verdict currently implements.
All three schemes are founded on standard, well-
understood cryptographic techniques that have been for-
mally developed and rigorously analyzed in prior work.
As with most practical, complex distributed systems with
many components, however, we cannot realistically offer
a rigorous proof that these cryptographic tools “fit to-
gether” correctly to form a perfectly secure overall sys-
tem. (This is true even of SSL/TLS and its ciphersuites,
which have received far more cryptographic scrutiny
than Verdict but in which flaws are still found regularly.)
We also make no claim that any of the current schemes
are “the right” ones or achieve any particular ideal; we
merely offer them as contrasting points in a large design
space. To lend some informal credibility to their secu-
rity, we note that our pairing-based scheme is closely
modeled on the verifiable DC-nets scheme that Golle and
Juels already developed formally [27], and Appendix C
sketches a security argument for the third and most com-
putationally efficient scheme.
5.1 Verifiable DC-net Primitive API
The core cryptographic primitive consists of a set of six
methods. Each of these six methods takes a list of proto-
col session parameters (e.g., group roster, session nonce,
slot owner’s public key) as an implicit argument:
• Cover Create: Given a client session secret key, return
a valid client ciphertext representing “cover traffic,”
which do not contain actual messages.
• Owner Create: Given a client session secret key, the
slot owner’s pseudonym secret key, and a plaintext
message m to be transmitted anonymously, return a
valid owner ciphertext that encodes message m.
• Client Verify: Given a client public key and a client
ciphertext, return a boolean flag indicating whether the
client ciphertext is valid.
• Server Create: Given a server private key and a set of
client ciphertexts, return a valid server ciphertext.
• Server Verify: Given a server public key, a set of valid
client ciphertexts, and a server ciphertext, return a flag
indicating whether the server ciphertext is valid.
• Reveal: Combine N client ciphertexts and M server
ciphertexts, returning the plaintext message m.
However these methods are implemented, they must
obey the following security properties, stated informally:
• Completeness: An honest verifier always accepts a
ciphertext generated by an honest client or server.
• Soundness: With overwhelming probability an hon-
est verifier rejects an incorrect ciphertext, such as an
owner ciphertext formed without knowledge of the
owner’s pseudonym secret key.
• Zero-knowledge: A verifier learns nothing about a ci-
phertext besides the fact that it is correctly formed.
• Integrity: Combining N valid client ciphertexts,
including one ciphertext from the anonymous slot
owner, and M valid server ciphertexts, reveals the slot
owner’s plaintext message.
• Anonymity: A verifier cannot distinguish a client
ciphertext from the anonymous slot owner’s cipher-
text. Appendix C offers a game-based definition of
anonymity.
In practice, each of our current implementations of
this verifiable DC-nets primitive achieve these security
properties in the random-oracle model [5] using non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs [28].
5.2 ElGamal-Style Construction
The first scheme builds on the ElGamal public-key cryp-
tosystem [21]. In ElGamal, a public/private keypair has
the form 〈B,b〉= 〈gb,b〉,1 and plaintexts and ciphertexts
are elements of an algebraic group G.2 We refer to this
as the “ElGamal-style” construction because its use of an
ephemeral public key and encryption by multiplication
structurally resembles the ElGamal cryptosystem. Our
construction does not exhibit the malleability of textbook
ElGamal encryption, however, because a proof of knowl-
edge of the secret ephemeral public key is attached to
every ciphertext element.
Client Ciphertext Construction Given a list of server
public keys 〈B1, . . . ,BM〉, a client constructs a ciphertext
1 We do not require that a trusted third party generate participants’
keypairs, but we do require participants to prove knowledge of their
secret key at the start of a protocol session, for reasons described in
Appendix A.
2 Throughout, unless otherwise noted, group elements are members
of a finite cyclic group G in which the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
problem [6] is assumed computationally infeasible, and g is a public
generator of G.
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by selecting an ephemeral public key Ri = gri at random





If the client is the slot owner, the client sets m to its secret
message, otherwise the client sets m = 1.
To satisfy the security properties described in Sec-
tion 5.1, the client must somehow prove that the ci-
phertext tuple 〈Ri,Ci〉 was generated correctly. We
adopt the technique of Golle and Juels [27] and use
a non-interactive proof-of-knowledge of discrete loga-
rithms [11] to prove that the ciphertext has the correct
form. If the slot owner’s pseudonym public key is Y ,
the client’s ephemeral public key is Ri, and the client’s
ciphertext element is Ci, the client generates a proof:
PoK{ri,y :
(
Ri = gri ∧Ci = (ΠMj=1B j)ri
)
∨Y = gy}
In words: the sender demonstrates that either it knows
the discrete logarithm ri of the ephemeral public key
Ri, and the ciphertext is the product of all server pub-
lic keys raised to the exponent ri; or the sender knows
the slot owner’s secret pseudonym key y, in which case
the slot owner can set Ci to a value of her choosing. Ap-
pendix D details how to construct and verify this type of
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.
Note that a dishonest slot owner can set Ci to a mali-
ciously constructed value (e.g., Ci = 1). The only effect
of such an “attack” is that the slot owner compromises
her own anonymity. Since a dishonest slot owner can
always compromise her own anonymity (e.g., by pub-
lishing her secret keys), a dishonest slot owner achieves
nothing by setting Ci maliciously.
The tuple 〈Ri,Ci,PoK〉 serves as the client’s cipher-
text. As explained in Section 4.1, all participants sign
the messages they exchange for accountability.
Server Ciphertext Construction Given a server pub-
lic key B j = gb j and a list of ephemeral client public keys





The server proves the validity of its ciphertext by creating
a non-interactive proof of knowledge that it knows its
secret private key b j and that its ciphertext element S j
is the product of the ephemeral client keys raised to the
exponent −b j:
PoK{b j : B j = gb j ∧S j = (ΠNi=1Ri)−b j}
Message Reveal To reveal the plaintext message, a
participant computes the product of N client ciphertext







Each factor grib j , where ri is client i’s ephemeral secret
key and b j is server j’s secret key, is included exactly
twice in the above product—once with a positive sign in
the client ciphertexts and once with a negative sign in the
server ciphertexts. These values therefore cancel, leaving
only the plaintext m.
Drawbacks Since the clients must use a new
ephemeral public key for each ciphertext element, send-
ing a plaintext message that is L group elements in length
requires each client to generate and transmit L ephemeral
public keys. The proof of knowledge for this construc-
tion is L+O(1) group elements long, so a message of L
group elements expands to 3L+O(1) elements.
5.3 Pairing-Based Construction
A major drawback of the ElGamal construction is that,
due to the need for ephemeral keys, every ciphertext is
three times as long as the plaintext it encodes. Golle
and Juels [27] use bilinear maps to eliminate the need for
ephemeral keys. Our pairing-based construction adopts
elements of their technique, while avoiding their reliance
on a trusted third party, a secret-sharing scheme, and a
probabilistic transmission scheduling algorithm.
A symmetric bilinear map eˆ maps two elements of
a group G1 into a target group G2—eˆ : G1 × G1 →
G2. A bilinear map has the property that: eˆ(aP,bQ) =
eˆ(P,Q)ab.3 To be useful, the map must also be non-
degenerate (if P is a generator of G1, eˆ(P,P) is a gen-
erator of G2) and efficiently computable [8]. We assume
that the decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption [7]
holds in G1.4
Since pairing allows a single pair of public keys to
generate a sequence of shared secrets, clients need not
generate ephemeral public keys for each ciphertext ele-
ment they send. This optimization leads to shorter ci-
phertexts and shorter correctness proofs.
Client Ciphertext Construction For a set of server
public keys 〈B1, . . . ,BM〉, a public nonce τ ∈ G1 com-
puted using a hash function, and a client public key
Ai = gai , a pairing-based client ciphertext has the form:
Ci = meˆ(ΠMj=1B j,τ)ai
As before, if the client is not the slot owner, the client sets
m= 1. Each client can produce a proof of the correctness
of its ciphertext by executing a proof of knowledge simi-
lar to one used in the ElGamal-style construction above:
PoK{ai,y : (Ai = gai ∧Ci = eˆ(ΠMj=1B j,τ)ai)∨Y = gy}
While the ElGamal-style scheme requires 3L+O(1)
group elements to encode L elements of plaintext, a
3 Since G1 is usually an elliptic curve group, the generator of G1
is written as P (an elliptic curve point) and the repeated group opera-
tion is written as aP instead of ga. We will use the latter notation for
consistency with the rest of this section.
4 Note that the decision Diffie-Hellman problem is easy in G1, since
given g,ga,gb,gc ∈ G1, a DDH tuple will always satisfy eˆ(ga,gb) =
eˆ(g,gc) if c = ab mod q.
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pairing-based ciphertext requires only L+O(1) group el-
ements to encode an L-element plaintext.
Server Ciphertext Construction Using a server pub-
lic key B j = gb j , a public round nonce τ , and client public
keys 〈A1, . . . ,AN〉, a server ciphertext has the form:
S j = eˆ(ΠNi=1Ai,τ)−b j
The server proof of correctness is then:
PoK{b j : B j = gb j ∧S j = eˆ(ΠNi=1Ai,τ)−b j}
Message Reveal To reveal the plaintext, the servers
take the product of all client and server ciphertexts:
m = (ΠNi=1Ci)(ΠMj=1S j)
Drawbacks The main downside of this construction is
the relatively high computational cost of the pairing oper-
ation. Computing the pairing operation on two elements
of G1 can take an order of magnitude longer than a nor-
mal elliptic curve point addition in a group of similar se-
curity level, as Section 6.2 below will show.
5.4 Hashing-Generator Construction
Our hashing-generator construction pursues a “best of
both worlds” combination of the ElGamal-style and
pairing-based constructions. This construction has
short ciphertexts, like the pairing-based construction,
but avoids the computational cost of the pairing-based
scheme by using conventional integer or elliptic curve
groups. To achieve both of these desired properties, the
hashing-generator construction adds some protocol com-
plexity, in the form of a session set-up phase.
Set-up Phase In the set-up phase, each client i es-
tablishes a Diffie-Hellman shared secret ri j with every
server j using their respective public keys gai and gb j by
computing ri j = KDF(gaib j ) using a key derivation func-
tion KDF. Clients publish commitments to these shared
secrets Ri j = gˆri j using another public generator gˆ.
The hashing-generator construction requires a process
by which participants compute a sequence of generators
g1, . . . ,gL of the group G, such that no participant knows
the discrete logarithm of any of these generators with
respect to any other generator. In other words, no one
knows an x such that gxi = g j, for any i, j pair. In prac-
tice, participants compute this sequence of generators by
hashing a series of strings, (e.g., the round nonce con-
catenated with “1”, “2”, “3”, . . . ), to choose the set of
generating group elements.
At the end of the set-up phase, every client i can
produce a sequence of shared secrets with each server
j using their shared secret ri j and the L generators:
gri j1 , . . . ,g
ri j
L . In the ℓth message exchange round, all par-
ticipants use generator gℓ as their common generator.
Client Ciphertext Construction To use the hashing-
generator scheme to create a ciphertext, the client uses its
shared secrets ri1, . . . ,riM with the servers, and generator




As before, m = 1 if the sender is not the slot owner.
To prove the validity of a ciphertext element, the client
executes the following proof of knowledge, where Y is
the slot owner’s pseudonym public key, ri =∑Mj=1 ri j, and
Ri j is the commitment to the secret shared between client
i and server j:
PoK{ri,y : ((ΠMj=1Ri j) = gˆri ∧Ci = g
ri
ℓ )∨Y = g
y}
Server Ciphertext Construction Server j’s ciphertext
for the ℓth message exchange round is similar to the
client ciphertext, except with negated exponents:
S j = g
(−∑Ni=1 ri j)
ℓ
The server proves correctness of a ciphertext by execut-
ing a proof of knowledge, where r j = ∑Ni=1 ri j:
PoK{r j : (ΠNi=1Ri j) = gˆr j ∧S j = g
−r j
ℓ }
Message Reveal The product of the client and server
ciphertexts reveals the slot owner’s plaintext message m:
m = (ΠNi=1Ci)(ΠMj=1S j)
Failed Session Set-up A dishonest client i might try
to disrupt the protocol by publishing a corrupted com-
mitment R′i j that disagrees with server j’s commitment
Ri j to the shared secret ri j = KDF(gaib j). If the commit-
ments disagree, the honest server can prove its innocence
by broadcasting the Diffie-Hellman secret ρi j = gaib j
along with a proof that it correctly computed the Diffie-
Hellman secret using its public key B j and the client’s
public key Ai.
PoK{b j : ρi j = A
b j
i ∧B j = g
b j}
If the server is dishonest, the client can produce a simi-
lar proof of innocence. Any user can verify this proof,
and then use gaib j to recreate the correct commitment
Ri j. Once the verifier has the correct commitment Ri j,
the verifier can confirm either that the client in question
published an invalid commitment or that the server in
question dishonestly accused the client.
Since the session set-up between client i and server
j will only fail if either i or j is dishonest, there is no
security risk to publishing the shared secret gaib j after a
failed set-up—the dishonest client (or server) could have
shared this secret with the adversary anyway.
Long Messages The client and server ciphertext con-
structions described above allow the slot owner to trans-
mit a plaintext message m that is at most one group el-
ement in length in each run of the protocol. To encode
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longer plaintexts efficiently, participants use a modified
proof-of-knowledge construction that proves the validity
of L ciphertext elements (Ci,1 through Ci,L) at once:
PoK{ri,y : ((ΠMj=1Ri j = gˆri)∧ (∧Lℓ=1Ci,ℓ = g
ri
ℓ ))∨Y = g
y}
Servers can use a similarly modified proof of knowledge.
This modified knowledge proof is surprisingly compact:
the length of the proof is constant in L, since the length
of the proof is linear in the number of proof variables
(here, the only variables are ri and y). The total length of
the tuple 〈~Ci,PoK〉 using this proof is L+O(1).
Lazy Proof Verification In the basic protocol, every
server verifies the validity proof on every client cipher-
text in every protocol round. To avoid these expensive
verification operations, servers can use lazy proof veri-
fication: servers check the validity of the client proofs
only if they detect, at the end of a protocol run, that the
anonymous slot owner’s message was corrupted. For
reasons discussed in Appendix E, lazy proof verifica-
tion is possible only using the pairing-based or hashing-
generator ciphertext constructions.
Security Analysis Since the hashing-generator
scheme is the most performant variant, we sketch an
informal security proof for the hashing-generator proof
construction in Appendix C.
6 Evaluation
This section describes our Verdict prototype implemen-
tation and summarizes the results of our evaluations.
6.1 Implementation
We implemented the Verdict protocol in C++ using the
Qt framework as an extension to the existing Dissent pro-
totype [54]. Our implementation uses OpenSSL 1.0.1 for
standard elliptic curve groups, Crypto++ 5.6.1 for big in-
teger groups, and the Stanford Pairing-Based Cryptogra-
phy (PBC) 0.5.12 library for pairings [50]. Unless other-
wise noted, the evaluations use 1024-bit integer groups,
the 256-bit NIST P-256 elliptic curve group [39], and
a pairing group in which G1 is an elliptic curve over a
512-bit field (using PBC’s “Type A” parameters) [32].
We collected the macrobenchmark and end-to-end eval-
uation results on the DeterLab [18] testbed.
The source code for our implementation is available at
https://github.com/DeDiS/Dissent.
6.2 Microbenchmarks
To compare the pure computational costs of the differ-
ent DC-net schemes, Figure 5 shows ciphertext gener-
ation and verification throughput measured at a variety
of block sizes, running on a workstation with a 3.2 GHz
Intel Xeon W3565 processor. These experiments involve
no network activity, and are single-threaded, thus they do
not reflect any speedup that parallelization might offer.
Figure 5: Ciphertext generation and verification through-
put for the three verifiable DC-net variants and the XOR-
based scheme.
The hashing-generator construction, which is the
fastest scheme tested, encrypts 20 KB of client plaintext
per second. The slowest, paring-based construction en-
crypts around 3 KB per second. The fastest verifiable
scheme is still over an order of magnitude slower than
the traditional (unverifiable) XOR-based scheme, which
encrypts 600 KB of plaintext per second. The hashing-
generator scheme performs best because it needs no pair-
ing operations and requires fewer group exponentiations
than the ElGamal construction.
Figure 5 shows that ciphertext verification is slightly
faster than ciphertext generation. This is because gener-
ating the ciphertext and zero-knowledge proof requires
more group exponentiations than proof verification does.
The three constructions also vary in the size of ci-
phertexts they generate (Figure 6). While the pairing-
based scheme and the hashing-generator schemes en-
crypt length L plaintexts as ciphertexts of length L +
O(1), the ElGamal-style scheme encrypts length L
plaintexts as length 3L + O(1) ciphertexts. As dis-
cussed in Section 5.2, for every plaintext message ele-
ment encrypted, ElGamal-style ciphertexts must include
an ephemeral public key and an additional proof-of-
knowledge group element. Since the hashing-generator
scheme is the fastest and avoids the ElGamal scheme’s
ciphertext expansion, subsequent experiments use the
hashing-generator scheme unless otherwise noted.
6.3 Accountability Cost
Figure 7 presents three graphs: (a) the time it takes to set
up a transmission schedule via a verifiable shuffle, prior
to DC-net communication, (b) the time required to exe-
cute a single DC-net protocol round in each scheme, and
(c) the time required to identify a disruptor. The graphs
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Figure 7: Time required to initialize a session, perform one messaging round, and to identify a disruptor.
Figure 6: Ciphertext expansion factor (overhead) using
the integer ElGamal-style, pairing-based, and hashing-
generator protocol variants.
with lazy proof verification, and the Dissent+Verdict hy-
brid DC-net. We ran this experiment on DeterLab using
8 servers and 128 clients. To scale beyond 128 clients,
we ran multiple client processes on each client machine.
Session setup time measures the time from session start
to just before the first DC-net messaging round.
The one-time session setup time for Verdict is longer
than for Dissent because the verifiable shuffle imple-
mentation Dissent uses is heavily optimized for shuffling
DSA signing keys. Shuffling Verdict public keys, which
are drawn from different group types, requires using a
less-optimized version of the verifiable shuffle. We do
not believe this cost is fundamental to the Verdict ap-
proach, and in any case these setup costs are typically
amortized over many DC-net rounds.
The Dissent+Verdict hybrid DC-net is just as fast as
Dissent in the normal case, since Dissent and the hy-
brid DC-net run exactly the same code if there is no ac-
tive disruptor in the group. Network latency comprises
the majority of the time for a messaging round when
using the Dissent and the hybrid Dissent+Verdict DC-
nets—messaging rounds take between 0.6 and 1.4 sec-
onds to complete in network sizes of 8 to 1,024 clients.
In contrast, Verdict becomes computationally limited at
64 clients, taking approximately 2.5 seconds per round.
Verdict (lazy) improves upon this by becoming compu-
tationally limited at 256 clients, requiring approximately
3 seconds per messaging round.
Verdict incurs the lowest accountability (blame) cost
of the four schemes. Verdict’s verifiable DC-net checks
the validity of each client ciphertext before processing it
further, so the time-to-blame in Verdict is equal to the
cost of verifying the validity proofs on N client cipher-
texts. “Verdict (lazy)” uses the lazy proof verification
technique described in Section 5.4—servers verify the
client proofs of correctness only if they detect a disrup-
tion. Lazy proof verification delays the verification op-
eration to the end of a messaging phase, so the time-to-
blame is slightly higher than in pure Verdict.
Dissent, which has the highest time-to-blame, has an
accountability process that requires the anonymous client
whose message was corrupted to submit an “accusation”
message to a lengthy verifiable shuffle protocol, in which
all members participate. This verifiable shuffle is the rea-
son that Dissent takes the longest to identify a disruptor.
The hybrid Dissent+Verdict DC-net (Section 4.4) avoids
Dissent’s extra verifiable shuffle by falling back instead
to a verifiable DC-net to resolve disruptions.
As Figure 7 shows, the messaging round time in the
hybrid Dissent+Verdict DC-net is as fast as in Dissent,
but the hybrid scheme reduces Dissent’s time to detect
misbehavior by roughly two orders of magnitude.
6.4 Anonymous Microblogging
Verdict’s ability to tolerate many dishonest nodes makes
it potentially attractive for anonymous microblogging in
groups of hundreds of nodes. In Twitter, messages have a
maximum length of 140 bytes, which means that a single
tweet can fit into a few 256-bit elliptic curve group ele-

























Figure 8: Rate at which various anonymity schemes pro-
cess tweets, for varying numbers of active users.
of tens of seconds or even a few minutes, which would
be unacceptable for interactive web browsing.
This experiment evaluates the suitability of Verdict for
small-scale anonymous microblogging applications, giv-
ing users anonymity among hundreds of nodes, e.g., for
students microblogging on a university campus. To test
Verdict in this scenario, we recorded 5,000 Twitter users’
activity for one-hour and then took subsets of this trace:
the smallest subset contained only the Tweets of the 40
most active users, and the largest subset contained the
Tweets of the 1,032 most active users. We replayed each
of these traces through Dissent and through Verdict, us-
ing each of the three ciphertext constructions.
We ran our experiment on DeterLab [18], on a test
topology consisting of eight servers connected to a 100
Mbps LAN with 10 ms of server-to-server latency, and
with each set of clients connecting to their upstream
server over a shared 100 Mbps link with 50 ms of latency.
Scarcity of testbed resources limited the number of avail-
able delay links, but our experiment attempts to approxi-
mate a wide-area deployment model in which clients are
geographically dispersed and bandwidth-limited.
Figure 8 shows the Tweet-rate latency induced by the
different anonymity systems relative to the baseline (no
anonymity) as the number of active users (and hence, the
anonymity set size) in the trace increases. Both Dissent
and the Dissent+Verdict hybrid systems can keep pace
with the baseline in a 1,000-node network—the largest
network size feasible on our testbed. The pure Verdict
variants could not keep pace with the baseline in a 1,000-
node network, while hashing-generator variant of Verdict
runs almost as quickly as the baseline in an anonymity
set size of 264. These results suggest that Verdict might
realistically support proactively accountable anonymity
for microblogging groups of up to hundreds of nodes.
Figure 8 also compares Verdict to a mix-net cascade
(a set of mix servers) in which each mix server uses a
Neff proof-of-knowledge [38] to demonstrate that it has
performed the mixing operation properly. Like Verdict,
this sort of mix cascade forms a traffic-analysis-resistant
anonymity system, so it might be used as an alternative
to Verdict for anonymous messaging. Our evaluation re-
sults demonstrate that the hashing-generator variant of
Verdict outperforms the mix cascade at all network sizes
and that the Tweet throughput of the Dissent+Verdict hy-
brid is more than 6× greater than the throughput of the
mix cascade at a network size of 564 participants.
6.5 Anonymous Web Browsing
Dissent demonstrated that accountable DC-nets are fast
enough to support anonymous interactive Web browsing
in local-area network deployments [54]. We now evalu-
ate whether Verdict is similarly usable in a web brows-
ing scenario. Our experiment simulates a group of nodes
connected to a single WLAN network. This configura-
tion emulates, for example, a group of users in an Inter-
net cafe´ browsing the Internet anonymously.
In our simulation on DeterLab [18], 8 servers and 24
clients communicate over a network of 24 Mbps links
with 20 ms node-to-node latency. To simulate a Web
browsing session, we recorded the sequence of requests
and responses that a browser makes to download home
page content (HTML, CSS files, images, etc.) from the
Alexa “Top 100” Web pages [2]. We then replayed this
trace with the client using one of four anonymity over-
lays: no anonymity, the Dissent DC-net, the Verdict-
only DC-net, and the Dissent+Verdict hybrid DC-net.
The simulated client sends the upstream (request) traf-
fic through the anonymity network and servers broadcast
the downstream (response) traffic to all nodes.
Figure 9 charts the time required to download all home
page content using the four different network configura-
tions. The median Web page took one second to load
with no anonymity, fewer than 10 seconds over Dissent,
and around 30 seconds using Verdict only (Figure 10).
Notably, the hybrid Dissent+Verdict scheme exhibits per-
formance nearly identical to that of Dissent alone, since it
it falls back to the slower verifiable Verdict DC-net only
when there is active disruption. The Verdict-only DC-net
is much slower than Dissent because every node must
generate a computationally expensive zero-knowledge
proof in every messaging round.
These experiments show that Verdict adds no overhead
to Dissent’s XOR-based DC-net in the absence of disrup-
tion. In addition, these experiments illustrate the flexi-
bility of verifiable DC-nets, which can be used either as
a “workhorse” for anonymous communication or more
selectively in combination with traditional XOR-based
DC-nets; we suspect that other interesting applications
will be discovered in the future.
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Figure 9: Time required to download home page context
for Alexa “Top 100” Web sites (with linear trend lines).
Figure 10: CDF of time required to download home page
context for Alexa “Top 100” Web sites.
7 Related Work
Chaum recognized the risk of anonymous disruption at-
tacks in his original formulation of DC-nets [13], and
proposed a probabilistic tracing approach based on traps,
upon which Waidner and Pfitzmann expanded [52].
Herbivore [26, 46] sidestepped the disruption issue by
forming groups dynamically, enabling nodes to leave dis-
rupted groups and form new groups until they find a
disruption-free group. Unfortunately, the likelihood that
a group contains some malicious node likely increases
rapidly with group size, and hence anonymity set, lim-
iting this and related partitioning approaches [1] to sys-
tems supporting small anonymity sets. Further, in an ana-
log to a known attack against Tor [9], an adversary might
selectively disrupt only groups he has only partially but
not completely compromised. With a powerful adversary
controlling many nodes, after some threshold a victim
becomes more likely to “settle into” a group that works
precisely because it is completely compromised, than to
find a working uncompromised group.
k-anonymous message transmission [1] also achieves
disruption resistance by partitioning participants into
small disruption-free groups. A crucial limitation of the
k-anonymity system is that an honest client is anony-
mous only among a small constant (k) number of nodes.
In contrast, Verdict clients in principle obtain anonymity
among the set of all honest clients using the system.
Dissent [15, 54] uses verifiable shuffles [10, 38] to es-
tablish a transmission schedule for DC-nets, enabling
groups to guarantee a one-to-one correspondence of
group members to anonymous transmission slots. The
original Dissent protocol [15] offered accountability but
limited performance. A more recent version [54] im-
proves performance and scalability, but uses a retrospec-
tive “blame” protocol which requires an expensive shuf-
fle when disruption is detected.
Golle and Juels [27] introduced the verifiable DC-net
concept and formally developed a scheme based on bilin-
ear maps, forming Verdict’s starting point. To our knowl-
edge this scheme was never implemented in a work-
ing anonymous communication system, however, and we
find that its expensive pairing operations limit its practi-
cal performance.
Crowds [42], LAP [29], Mixminion [17], Tarzan [23],
and Tor [19], provide anonymity in large networks, but
these systems cannot protect against adversaries that ob-
serve traffic [4, 37] or perform active attacks [9] on a
large fraction of network links. Verdict maintains its se-
curity properties in the presence of this type of strong ad-
versary. A cascade of cryptographically verifiable shuf-
fles [25, 38] can offer the same security guarantees that
Verdict does, but these shuffles generally require more
expensive proofs-of-knowledge.
8 Conclusion
Verdict is a new anonymous group messaging system
that combines the traffic analysis resistance of DC-nets
with disruption resistance based on public-key cryptog-
raphy and knowledge proofs. Our experiments show that
Verdict may be suitable for messaging in groups of hun-
dreds to thousands of users, and can be combined with
traditional XOR-based DC-nets to offer good normal-
case performance while reducing the system’s vulnera-
bility to disruption events by two orders of magnitude.
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A Maliciously Crafted Public Keys
The protocol construction does not assume the existence
of a trusted third party who generates participants pub-
lic/private keypairs. Instead, every client must verify the
validity of every server’s public key ga at the start of a
protocol run, and every server must verify the validity of
every client’s public key as well.
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Participants can verify that a public key ga is valid
by confirming that ga ∈ G. However, this check is not
enough to prevent malicious participants from disrupt-
ing a protocol run. For example, if an honest server
published a public key A = ga, a dishonest server could
publish a public key B = (gb)(ga)−1 = gb−a whose cor-
responding secret key is a function of A’s secret key.
If a client then uses the ElGamal-style ciphertext con-
struction to create a ciphertext using ephemeral private
key r encrypted for both servers, the product of the two
servers’ public keys will result in an encryption that
server B can decrypt unilaterally:
C = m(AB)r = m((ga)(gb)(ga)−1)r = mgrb
By creating a public key in this way, server B can “cancel
out” the effect of A’s public key even without A’s coop-
eration.
To prevent this sort of attack, we require participants to
prove knowledge of the discrete logarithm of their public
key. In the notation of Camenisch and Stadler, partici-
pant must prove:
PoK{a : A = ga}
Requiring this proof defeats the attack outline above, be-
cause without knowledge of A’s secret key a server B
cannot prove knowledge of the secret exponent b− a.
Since we use public keys of the form ga in each of the
three ciphertext constructions, it is possible to execute
this proof of knowledge regardless of which scheme is in
use.
B Security of Messaging Protocol
This section sketches a security argument that the mes-
saging protocol described in Section 4 satisfies the secu-
rity properties of integrity, anonymity, and accountabil-
ity, provided that the underlying cryptographic primitives
(described in Section 5) are correct.
B.1 Integrity
Since every protocol message is signed with the sender’s
long-term signing key, and since each message includes a
round nonce unique to this particular run of the protocol,
replay and impersonation attacks are infeasible.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that some honest
client h concludes that the protocol run has terminated in
success and that h holds a final output message m′ that is
unequal to the slot owner’s plaintext message m.
For h to conclude that the protocol run succeeded, h
would have had to receive a valid signature on the invalid
ciphertext m′ from each of the M servers in Phase 6
Since at least one of the M servers is honest, at least
one of the servers (call this server s), verified each of the
proofs of correctness on each of the server ciphertexts
in Phase 4. Since (by assumption) the ciphertext con-
struction is sound, each of the server ciphertexts must
therefore be a correctly formed server ciphertext (except
with negligible probability) corresponding to the client
ciphertext set that s received in Phase 5.
In addition, honest server s has verified the proof of
correctness on each of the client ciphertexts (Phase 3),
and the ciphertext soundness property (Section 5.1)
means that each of these ciphertexts is also validly con-
structed.
Since the plaintext element m′ that h receives is
the product of N valid client ciphertexts, and of M
valid server ciphertexts—one from each server and con-
structed in response to the client ciphertext set—the
product of these ciphertexts will be the slot owner’s orig-
inal plaintext m. Since we have m = m′, but m 6= m′ by
assumption, this is a contradiction.
B.2 Anonymity
The anonymity of the overall protocol derives directly
from the anonymity of the underlying cryptographic con-
struction (Section 5). To break the anonymity of the sys-
tem, an adversary must gain some advantage in distin-
guishing the slot owner from other clients participating
in the protocol. Since the only difference in behavior be-
tween the slot owner and the remaining clients comes in
Phase 1 of the protocol (in which participants generate
their ciphertext messages), the adversary must be able to
use the ciphertext messages alone to distinguish the slot
owner from others. However, since we assume that the
underlying cryptographic primitive maintains slot owner
anonymity, the attacker has no feasible way to distin-
guish the slot owner’s ciphertext from the remaining ci-
phertexts. We discuss the specific indistinguishability
assumptions used in each cryptographic construction in
Section 5.
B.3 Accountability
The accountability property requires that if an honest
node concludes that a protocol run has terminated in fail-
ure, it holds a third-party verifiable proof of (at least) one
dishonest node’s misbehavior.
We enumerate the ways in which a node can misbe-
have and demonstrate how an honest node can detect
each type of misbehavior:
• Invalid public key (session set-up) A client or server
who submits an invalid public key or an invalid proof
of knowledge during the session set-up process will
be immediately exposed by the recipient, and the mes-
sage containing the invalid key becomes proof of the
key generator’s dishonesty.
The proof of knowledge ensures that a dishonest node
will be unable to pass off an honest node’s public key
as his own (since the dishonest node will be unable to
produce a signature of his own long-term public key
with the honest node’s public key).
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• Invalid client ciphertext (Phase 1) A client who sub-
mits an invalid ciphertext in Phase 1 will be exposed
by the receiving server in Phase 2 (if the receiving
server is honest) when the server checks the validity
of the client’s ciphertext. The signed, invalid cipher-
text submitted by the client is the proof of the client’s
dishonesty. If the server is dishonest, the server will
be exposed later in the protocol.
• Client equivocation (Phase 1) A client who submits
two different ciphertexts to two different servers will
be exposed by an honest server in Phase 3 when the
server observes the two different valid signed client
ciphertexts in two servers’ client ciphertext sets. These
two ciphertexts will become the proof of the client’s
dishonesty.
• Server accepts invalid ciphertext (Phase 2) If a
server accepts an invalid ciphertext from a client, an
honest server will detect this dishonesty in Phase 3,
since the dishonest server’s ciphertext set will not
match the honest server’s ciphertext set (since hon-
est servers will only transmit a ciphertext set if all
client ciphertexts are valid). The honest server will
use the dishonest server’s ciphertext set as its proof of
the server’s dishonesty.
• Invalid server ciphertext (Phase 3) An honest server
in Phase 4 will expose a dishonest server that has
broadcasted an invalid server ciphertext in Phase 3.
The invalid server ciphertext serves as the proof of the
server’s dishonesty.
• Invalid server signature (Phase 4) Since, in Phase 4,
all servers hold the same set of valid client ciphertexts,
and a set of M valid server ciphertexts, each honest
server will be able to recover the same plaintext mes-
sage. An honest server in Phase 5 will expose a dis-
honest server that has broadcasted an invalid signature
in Phase 4 when the honest server checks the dishonest
server’s signature against the revealed plaintext. The
invalid signature serves as proof of the server’s dishon-
esty.
• Corrupted signature from server (Phase 5) A server
that transmits invalid signatures to its downstream
clients in Phase 5 will be revealed by honest clients in
Phase 6. Since an honest server will verify each sig-
nature before sending them to its downstream clients,
an honest client can conclude that if any of the signa-
tures on the plaintext is invalid, its upstream server is
dishonest.
• Un-parseable message (all phases) If an honest par-
ticipant ever receives an un-parseable message from
another participant, that carries a valid signature with
the sender’s long-term signing key, the signed message
becomes proof of the dishonest node’s misbehavior.
C Security Arguments
This section provides a game-based definition of the
anonymity property (introduced in Section 5.1) and then
argues for the security of the hashing-generator cipher-
text construction (introduced in Section 5.4).
C.1 Anonymity Game
We say that a protocol maintains slot owner anonymity
if the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary in the
following anonymity game is negligible (in the implicit
security parameter). The game, which takes place be-
tween an adversary and a challenger, proceeds as fol-
lows:
• The challenger picks per-session keypairs for the slot
owner, for each of the M servers, and for each of the
N clients.
• The challenger sends to the adversary:
– all of the public keys,
– the private keys for the M− 1 dishonest servers,
and
– the private keys for the N− 2 dishonest clients.
The challenger holds the private key for the one honest
server and the two honest clients.
• The adversary picks a plaintext message m and sends
it to the challenger.
• The challenger picks a value β ∈ {1,2} at random.
The challenger sets the slot owner to be honest client
β .
• The challenger and adversary run the anonymous com-
munication protocol, with the challenger playing the
role of the honest participants and the adversary play-
ing the role of the dishonest participants.
• At the conclusion of the protocol, the adversary makes
a guess β ′ of the value β .
The adversary’s advantage ε in the game is |Pr[β = β ′]−
1
2 |. If ε is negligible, we say that the protocol maintains
slot owner anonymity.
Note that this formulation of the anonymity game as-
sumes that all participants’ keypairs are generated hon-
estly (i.e., that a dishonest node’s public key does not de-
pend on an honest node’s public key in a way that could
harm the security of the protocol). In practice, we assure




In the following section, we demonstrate that in the ran-
dom oracle model [5] and under the decision Diffie-
Hellman assumption [6], the hashing-generator cipher-
text construction satisfies the security properties of Sec-
tion 5.1. The security arguments for the ElGamal-style
scheme and the pairing-based schemes proceed in a sim-
ilar fashion, but we focus on the hashing-generator con-
struction because it is the most performant of the three
variants.
Proof Sketch (Completeness, Soundness, Zero–
Knowledge) The client and server ciphertexts are
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge,
adopted directly from prior work [11, 16, 22, 28]. Our
completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge proper-
ties of Section 5.1 follow immediately from the com-
pleteness, special soundness, and special honest-verifier
zero knowledge properties of the underlying proof sys-
tem.
Proof Sketch (Integrity) Since the ciphertext con-
struction maintains soundness (as argued above), any
client or server ciphertext that an honest node finds to be
valid will have the correct form. Taking the product of N
correctly constructed client ciphertexts and M correctly
constructed server ciphertexts will result in the cancella-
tion of each pair of client/server shared secrets gri jℓ in the
product. (This is because both gri jℓ and its inverse are in-
cluded in the product.) The resulting product, then, will
be the slot owner’s plaintext message m.
Proof Sketch (Anonymity) An adversary who wants
to break the protocol’s anonymity has two choices: (1)
the adversary can deviate from the protocol specification
in some malicious way, or (2) the adversary can follow
the protocol specification exactly and try to break the
anonymity by passively observing messages from hon-
est nodes.
Consider the adversary’s first option (to violate the
protocol in a malicious way). The only opportunities
that an adversarial client has to deviate from the pro-
tocol are to (a) publish an incorrect commitment to its
shared secret or (b) submit an invalid client ciphertext.
Option (a) will not help a malicious client, since the in-
valid commitment will be detected by honest nodes and
will halt the protocol. Option (b) will not help a ma-
licious client either, because the soundness property of
the zero-knowledge proof system means that an invalid
ciphertext will be rejected by the honest server (thereby
halting the protocol run).
An adversarial server can also violate the protocol, but
these violations will not help it win the anonymity game
either. The server can publish an invalid commitment in
the setup phase, but honest nodes will detect this. The
server can try to manipulate the set of client ciphertexts,
but all honest nodes will detect this as well. The server
can broadcast an invalid server ciphertext, but honest
nodes will detect this also.
The accountability property of the messaging proto-
col, in combination with the soundness property of the
zero-knowledge proof construction, makes it infeasible
for the adversary to gain any information by violating
the protocol. (Of course, the adversarial nodes can try to
collude to disrupt the protocol as well, but collusion will
not enable the adversary to learn anything that it does not
already know.)
The adversary’s other possible strategy is to follow the
protocol correctly and to try to guess who the slot owner
is based on a successful run of the protocol. We demon-
strate that this strategy is ineffective as well: if there
exists an efficient algorithm A that has an advantage in
the anonymity game, there is another efficient algorithm
B that has an advantage in the decision Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) game, contradicts the DDH assumption.
The input to the algorithm B is a DDH challenge tuple
〈gˆ, gˆx, gˆy, gˆz〉 and B must output “yes” if z = xy and “no”
otherwise. (This generator gˆ is the same generator gˆ used
in Section 5.4.)
To use algorithm A as a subroutine, B must simulate
A’s view of a run of the protocol. The simulation pro-
ceeds as follows, with B simulating the role of the chal-
lenger and with A playing the role of the adversary:
• The simulator decides which honest client β ∈ {1,2}
will serve as the anonymous slot owner. (We describe
the case in which β = 1, but if β = 2, the roles of the
two honest clients are simply swapped.)
• The simulator selects public keys for all of the clients
and servers. In the setup phase, the simulator pro-
grams the key-derivation function KDF, modeled as
a random oracle, to (virtually) assign the value y to
the the secret shared r1,1 between honest client h1 and
honest server s1. (We say that r1,1 is “virtually” set
to y because the simulator does not actually know the
value y. The simulator only needs to reveal gˆy to A, so
the simulator never needs to know y itself.) The sim-
ulator assigns random values to all secrets ri j shared
between every other client/server pair.
• The simulator must publish commitments Ri j = gˆri j to
each of the honest participants’ shared secrets. The
simulator knows all of the values ri j (except r1,1), so it
can compute almost all of these commitments directly.
The simulator uses gˆy from the DDH challenge as the
commitment to r1,1.
• The simulator receives a message m from A.
• Recall that in the hashing-generator scheme, all par-
ticipants use a public hash function H (again modeled
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as a random oracle) to select the group generator used
in each message transmission round.
The simulator programsH to output gˆx as the generator
in the first transmission round. The simulator uses gˆz












Recall that both the client and server ciphertexts must
carry non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of cor-
rectness. In the random-oracle model, the simulator
can efficiently simulate these proofs using standard
techniques [5] (i.e., by picking the “challenge” value
used in the proof before generating the proof’s com-
mitments).
At the conclusion of the simulation, algorithm A will
output a guess β ′ ∈ {1,2} that honest client hβ ′ was the
slot owner during the protocol run. Algorithm B outputs
“yes” (the challenge tuple is a Diffie-Hellman tuple) if
β ′ = 1 and “no” otherwise.
With probability 1/2, (when z = xy), B will correctly
simulate the view of the challenger and B will win the
DDH game with probability ε . With probability 1/2,
(when z 6= xy), B will produce ciphertexts C1 and C2 that
are group elements selected at random by the DDH chal-
lenger. In this latter case, B will have no advantage in the
DDH game (since A cannot possibly have an advantage
in the anonymity game).
Thus, if A’s advantage in winning the anonymity game
is some non-negligible value ε , then B’s advantage in
winning the DDH game is ε/2 (which is non-negligible).
D Zero-Knowledge Proof Instantiation
The cryptographic constructions presented in Section 5
make extensive use of non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge. This section presents an example
instantiation of one such proof of knowledge to make the
technique concrete. The proof-of-knowledge techniques
used in Verdict follow primarily from the work of Ca-
menisch and Stadler [11] which follows in turn from ear-
lier work on proofs of knowledge [16, 22, 44].
Proof-of-knowledge protocols are interactive by na-
ture, but they can be made non-interactive by replac-
ing the role of an interacting verifier with a hash
function. This technique, developed by Fiat and
Shamir [22], allows for security proofs in the “random-
oracle model” [5]. To avoid the unwieldy phrase
“non-interactive honest-verifier computationally zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge,” we write “proof.”
Our construction uses non-interactive proofs based
on Schnorr’s proof of knowledge of discrete loga-
rithms [44], proof of equality of discrete logarithms [14],
and witness-hiding proofs [16] (which demonstrate that
the prover knows at least one out of n secrets).
We will demonstrate an instantiation of the client
ciphertext proof of correctness used in the ElGamal-
style construction, introduced in Section 5.2. Proofs for
the other ciphertext constructions have almost identical
form, so we omit their description herein.
This description assumes that all group elements are
elements of a group G of order q such that the deci-
sion Diffie-Hellman problem [6] is hard in G. Given
an ephemeral public key R = gr, a ciphertext element
C, server public keys 〈B1, . . .BM〉, and the slot owner’s
pseudonym public key Y , the client executes a proof
of knowledge over the secrets r (the ephemeral secret
key) and y (the slot owner’s pseudonym secret key). If
the client is the slot owner, the client will know the
pseudonym secret key y. If the client is not the slot
owner, the client will know the ephemeral secret key r.
The proof has the form:
PoK{r,y : (R = gr ∧C = (ΠMj=1B j)r)∨Y = gy}
To simplify the notation, we relabel the variables such
that each discrete logarithm relationship has the form
yi = gxii . Note that the g and y values are public, while
the x values are known only to the prover (in this case,
prover is the client generating the ciphertext).
g1 = g x1 = r y1 = R
g2 = ΠMj1B j x2 = r y2 =C
g3 = g x3 = y y3 = Y
To rewrite the proof statement with the new variable
names:
PoK{x1,x2,x3 : (y1 = g
x1
1 ∧ y2 = g
x2
2 ∧ x1 = x2)∨ y3 = g
x3
3 }
The proof has three phases: commitment, challenge,
and response. Application of the Fiat-Shamir heuris-
tic [22] means that interaction with the verifier in the
“challenge” phase is replaced by a call to a hash func-
tion H (modeled as a random oracle).
There are two versions of this proof: one in which the
prover knows x1 and x2 (recall that x1 = x2), and another
in which the prover knows x3. These proofs have similar
structure, so we present only the former variant.
Commitment The commitment values (t1, t2, t3) are:
v1,v2,w ∈R Zq
t1 = gv11 t2 = g
v1






Challenges The challenge values (c1,c2) are:
h = H (g1,g2,g3,y1,y2,y3, t1, t2, t3)
c1 = h−w mod q
c2 = w
Response The response values (r1,r2) are:
r1 = v1− c1x1 mod q
r2 = v2
The final proof is (c1,c2,r1,r2).
Verification To verify the proof, the verifier first recre-
ates the commitments:

















If the proof is valid, then the t ′s values should be equal
to the original t values (recall that x1 = x2):





































Finally, the verifier confirms that c1 + c2
?
=
H (g1,g2,g3,y1,y2,y3, t1, t2, t3).
Security The protocol described above satisfies stan-
dard security properties for proof-of-knowledge proto-
cols [16]. We briefly summarize these properties and
sketch a proof that they hold for this proof-of-knowledge.
• Completeness: an honest verifier always accepts a
proof generated by an honest prover. This is verified
by simply observing (by algebraic manipulation) that
any valid proof generated by the prover will satisfy the
verification equations.
• Special soundness: given any valid pair of commit-
challenge-response transcripts (t1, t2, t3,c1,c2,r1,r2)
and (t1, t2, t3,c′1,c′2,r′1,r′2) such that c1 6= c′1 and c2 6=
c′2, it is possible to extract the prover’s secret value
used to generate the proof of knowledge.
Consider two accepting conversations generated using











If both proofs are valid, then these relations holds (by
the verification equation):
r1 = v1− c1x1 r
′
1 = v1− c
′
1x1
Recovering the secret value x1 (and hence demonstrat-
ing special soundness) requires solving this system for







• Honest-verifier computational zero-knowledge:
there is a simulator that, when given the statement
and the challenge h as input, produces transcripts
computationally indistinguishable from those that an
honest prover would produce in responding to h.
It is straightforward to construct a simulator that, when
given h, produces accepting transcripts that are com-
putationally indistinguishable from a prover-generated
transcript.
The simulator receives h as input and picks a random
exponent w ∈R Zq. The simulator sets:
c1 = h−w
c2 = w
The simulator then picks v1,v2 ∈R Zq, and sets the re-
sponses:
r1 = v1 r2 = v2














Simple substitution into the verification equation con-
firms that the simulator’s transcript is valid and that
it is computationally indistinguishable from a prover-
generated one.
E Lazy Proof Verification
The lazy proof verification technique described in Sec-
tion 5.4 is an optimization in which servers to pro-
cess client ciphertexts without checking the ciphertexts’
proofs of validity. Servers only check the client proofs
if they fail to recover the slot owner’s plaintext message
later in the protocol run.
Implementing lazy proof verification is straightfor-
ward: when the slot owner submits the plaintext mes-
sage m to a run of the protocol, the slot owner con-
structs m such that it consists of the plaintext message
m′ and a cryptographic signature (using the slot owner’s
pseudonym signing key) of m′:5
m = 〈m′,SIGNSlotOwner(m
′)〉
5In practice, the value m is encoded as a vector of group elements.
To simplify our exposition, we pretend in this section that m consists of
a single group element.
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The slot owner then submits m as the plaintext mes-
sage to the Verdict protocol run. When servers reach
the point in the protocol in which they obtain the slot
owner’s plaintext message m, they parse m into 〈m′,σ〉.
If σ is a valid signature on m′, the servers return m′ to
the clients as the slot owner’s plaintext. Otherwise, the
servers check each of the client proofs to expose the dis-
honest client.
Lazy proof verification introduces a subtle security is-
sue that makes it insecure with the ElGamal-style con-
struction (but secure with the other schemes). If servers
use lazy proof verification with the ElGamal-style ci-
phertext construction, a malicious client could submit
a ciphertext that “cancels out” the ciphertexts of other
clients, thereby violating the security properties of the
system.
For example, consider a protocol run in which there
are three clients—two honest clients and one dishonest
client—and two honest servers with public keys ga and
gb. Using the ElGamal-style ciphertext construction, The




Given these two correct client ciphertexts, the dishonest
client makes a guess that client 1 is the slot owner. To
confirm this guess, the dishonest client constructs a client





The dishonest client can construct this ciphertext because
it is easy to invert elements of the groups we use. The
proof of knowledge PoK3 is invalid because dishonest
client 3 does not know the secret exponent−s and there-
fore cannot (by the special soundness property) cannot
construct a valid proof of knowledge.
If the servers accept these three ciphertexts without
verifying the accompanying proofs of knowledge, the
servers will generate their server ciphertext elements in
response to the ciphertexts 〈C1,C2,C3〉:
S1 = g−a(r+s−s) S2 = g−b(r+s−s)









Since the servers recover the slot owner’s original signed
plaintext message m′, the servers will not suspect any
malicious behavior on the part of the dishonest client.
The dishonest client, however, has learned that client 1
is the anonymous slot owner. The dishonest client knows
this because his ciphertext message C3 effectively can-
cels out the effect of honest client C2’s ciphertext (be-
cause C3 is the inverse of C2). If instead client 2 was the
anonymous slot owner, then the client 3’s malicious ci-
phertext would have cancelled out the plaintext message
encoded in client 2’s ciphertext, and the servers would
have concluded that m∗ = 1. Since the servers success-
fully recovered the slot owner’s plaintext message, client
3 correctly concludes that client 1 was the slot owner.
The sketch above demonstrates why lazy proof ver-
ification is insecure when used with ElGamal-style ci-
phertexts. We now argue that lazy proof verification is
secure in the hashing-generator construction. (The secu-
rity argument for the pairing-based scheme has a similar
structure.)
In the hashing-generator construction, every client i
and every server j share a secret ri j. Consider the attack
scenario above, with two honest clients and one dishon-
est client. The honest clients’ ciphertexts in messaging
round ℓ will be:
C1 = mgr11+r12ℓ
C2 = gr21+r22ℓ
The dishonest client can try a trick similar to the one
demonstrated before—she constructs a ciphertext that






The servers then construct their ciphertexts:
S1 = g−r11−r21−r31ℓ
S2 = g−r12−r22−r32ℓ
When the servers take the product of all of the client
and server ciphertexts to reveal the slot owner’s message
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In this case, the servers will notice the corruption, will
verify the client proofs of knowledge, and will expose
client 3 as dishonest. In addition, since the slot owner’s
plaintext message would also be corrupted if the dishon-
est client chose to attack client 1’s ciphertext, the dishon-
est client does not learn which honest client is the slot
owner.
This attack fails in the general case as well. In the
hashing-generator construction, each honest server pro-
duces the same server ciphertext element in messaging
round ℓ irrespective of the ciphertexts that the clients sub-
mit in that round. (This is in contrast with the ElGamal-
style construction, in which server ciphertexts depend
on the client ciphertexts.) A dishonest client therefore
does not learn any additional information from an hon-
est client or server by submitting an incorrectly formed
ciphertext. Lazy proof verification is then secure when
using the hashing-generator ciphertext construction.
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